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ABSTRACT

This paper builds on the need for earlier and earlier consideration of cybersecurity risks in the information systems life cycle
by focusing on how cybersecurity threats apply to project execution, and whether the project manager should become more
cyber-aware. Recent high-profile cases and decisions by the United States Department of Defense (US DoD) support early
identification and analysis of cyber security risks. While the authors found no current academic research linking cybersecurity
risks and project management, they did find a link between cybersecurity and information technology supply chain
management. The paper makes the case for early cybersecurity risk management, and suggests that project managers broaden
their awareness of cybersecurity risks. Future directions in the examination of early cybersecurity risks in projects are explored.
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INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity threats are increasingly recognized as a significant concern for projects undertaken by private businesses and
government organizations. Reports of security breaches and criminal misconduct can be seen daily in major news sources.
Recent high-profile events have highlighted the risks that cybersecurity threats can pose to any project and their stakeholder
organizations (Rushe, 2015; Rieder, 2014; Perez and Wallace, 2014; Basu, 2105). Evidence indicates that cybersecurity threats
are not slowing but increasing. The number of cyberattacks worldwide increased by 25% in 2013, and in that same year, four
of the 10 largest data breaches in Internet history occurred (Hendershot, 2014).
Recent evidence suggests that cybersecurity threats are becoming a concern earlier in the information systems life cycle. This
paper examines three lines of evidence, exploring the issue of whether cybersecurity risk management should take place early,
and how early. Specifically, we address the question,
Are cybersecurity threats a significant concern for IS projects and project managers?
The question is an important one because it identifies a major, common information systems activity—project management—
targeting it as a potential soft spot for cyberattacks. It is not only a “when” question (during projects) but also a “what” question
(what assets are vulnerable and what attacks should we be concerned about) and a “who” question (who are the attackers and
who is responsible for early cybersecurity). If vulnerable, projects should be subject to enhanced cybersecurity risk
management, and further research into cybersecurity issues in project management would be warranted. These issues would
include the when, what, and who questions for future discovery.
DIRECT CYBERSECURITY THREATS AS RISKS TO EXECUTION AND DELIVERABLES

There is evidence that cybersecurity threats pose risks to projects in terms of both project execution as well the project
deliverables (Hendershot, 2014; US DoD, Sept. 2015). Any cybersecurity risk that would affect an organization can also affect
projects within that organization. For example, most projects depend on the same enabling technology resources to carry out
project tasks (e.g. - mobile devices, infrastructure, networks, and workstations) that are also used for other business activities.
If these devices are disabled or compromised, impacts to the project will be unavoidable and may be disastrous. Security
controls at the organization level, such as two-factor authentication, may be needed to mitigate specific project risks
(Hendershot, 2014).
The deliverables of a project may also be vulnerable to cybersecurity risks, and this becomes a concern for the project manager
as well. For example, a decision to source components for a new product from a supplier with competing interests can result
in serious cybersecurity risks. For example, in 2012 researchers discovered that microchips designated for military use had
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security backdoors allowing for theft of intellectual property and possible introduction of malicious code (Skorobogatov and
Woods, 2012).
PROJECT RISK FROM CYBERATTACKS ON SUPPLY CHAIN

Any project involving the creation of a new product or service will require the acquisition of resources, including human
resources. Recent attacks at Target (Vijayan, 2014) have demonstrated that outside suppliers may be a source of risk related
to cybersecurity that should be considered by the project manager. Projects consist of insiders such as members of the user
group or the project team with access to potentially sensitive information and systems that they otherwise might not have access
to once the system is fully deployed.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

Academic research also supports the idea. The supply chain has emerged as a potential area of vulnerability to cybersecurity
risks in recent studies (Windelburg, 2016; Boyson 2014). Upton and Creese (2014), researchers in the area of insider threats,
state that several sources estimate at least 80 million such incidents per year, with costs in the tens of billions.
Many projects also involve the integration of components from various suppliers. This also has been shown to a source of risk
for the project and the project deliverables. A widely-publicized 2012 study by Skorobogatov and Woods (2012) demonstrated
that adversaries could inject “back doors” into the design of integrated circuits, such that the introduction of malicious code
such as Trojans, or even the disabling of the chip, would be possible. The vulnerable chips were the “ProASIC3 chip (which)
is used in medical, automotive, communications and consumer products, as well as military use”. This is a risk for many
potentially critical project outputs such as aircraft designs like the Boeing 787 (Arthur, 2012). Selection of suppliers is a part
of project management concern, as it related to both procurement and the quality of the project output (PMI, 2013).
TOWARDS CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN PROJECTS

Tentatively, it would seem that evidence from recent published breaches, the academic literature on IT supply chain
cybersecurity, and the U.S. DoD’s recent directives on acquisitions cybersecurity all indicate that cybersecurity threats early in
the life cycle are real. Further research may be needed, however, to verify and quantify the extent to which early life cycle
threats are actually occurring.
Given the preliminary evidence of early life cycle cybersecurity risk, we move on to explore the link between cybersecurity
and projects. Cybersecurity threats present unique challenges to project management due to the unique nature of the risks, the
specialized knowledge required to assess them, and the security controls needed to avoid or mitigate them. Cybersecurity
threats are extremely broad in nature – both in terms of the wide variety of potential attack vectors, the types and mechanisms
of threats, and the fact that all phases of the project are potentially affected (US DoD, Jan. 2015 and Sept. 2015). The risks
posed by cybersecurity threats change rapidly – new threats and vulnerabilities are discovered constantly. This underscores
the need for a multidisciplinary approach and constant vigilance (Hendershot, 2014). Controlling risks associated with
cybersecurity threats often require highly specialized and technical security controls, such as firewalls, intrusion detection
software, and network segregation – these require specialists to implement and monitor.
US GOVERNMENT TREATMENT OF CYBERSECURITY THREATS AS PROJECT RISKS

In response to the growing cybersecurity threats, the United States Department of Defense is transitioning its defensive posture
from “a historically compliance-based process to a risk-based, full-lifecycle approach” (US DoD, Sept. 2015). The change is
based on a belief that cyberattacks will be coming earlier and often, and will bring increased risk to highly interconnected DoD
systems (US DoD, Jan. 2015). So, instead of focusing on post-project security testing of recently completed systems, the new
DoD cybersecurity approach is focusing instead on cybersecurity risk management throughout the project life cycle. The new
approach is more iterative. It is more about testing throughout rather than testing at the end, consistent with software
engineering best practices. It requires early involvement on the part of cybersecurity specialists, and more cyber awareness on
the part of project managers. Specifically, the DoD is implementing the new approach by requiring every acquisitions program
with an IT component to include cybersecurity risk management (US DoD, Jan. 2015). The directive is a broad requirement
capturing not only weapon systems but also all other IT acquisitions.
CURRENT RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES FOR PROJECTS RELATED TO CYBERSECURITY

Two risk management models were reviewed which appear useful for the management of cybersecurity-related project risks:
1.

The PMI Project Management Body of Knowledge, 5th Ed. risk management process (PMI, 2013), selected to
represent widely-accepted risk management practices in projects.
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“DoD Program Manager’s Guidebook for Integrating the Cybersecurity Risk Management Framework (RMF) into
the System Acquisition Lifecycle” (DoD, Sept 2015), selected to represent a cybersecurity-specific risk management
framework based on recognized best practices by the US Department of Defense

These two models each have their own strengths for the project manager in the cybersecurity domain. The PMI Model reflects
known good practices and overarching project management processes. It is an ANSI standard for project management that has
been widely reviewed and adopted (PMI, 2013). The DoD Program Managers Guidebook represents the culmination of an
extensive multi-agency review to identify and define the best practices for managing cybersecurity risks based on the DoD’s
long experience in being a constant target of cyberattacks (US DoD, Sept 2015). It includes NIST standard 800-53r4 (NIST,
2013), which is often cited, and is an implementation of the DoD Risk Management Framework. It is required to be used for
highly sensitive programs whose purpose is to acquire systems deemed vital to national security (US DoD, Sept 2015).
Based on a review of the language and intent of the process steps in each model, it was noted that it may be possible in a future
research effort to adapt the DoD Cybersecurity Risk Management model (US DoD, Sept 2015) to include concepts and language
from the PMI Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMI, 2013). The resulting cybersecurity process might then send
information into the risk register, and thereby interface with the standard PMI risk management processes for the project. The
two frameworks, along with this potential linkage, is shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Cybersecurity Risk Management Processes
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Cybersecurity is a key area of risk management for businesses and organizations, and has been demonstrated to affect
information systems early in the life cycle and involving players in the IT supply chain. The U.S. DoD has targeted acquisitions
as an area of improvement, believing a significant cyber risk is present. It is expected that further examples of actualized risks
in projects will continue to appear in the news and in trade journals.
There are unique challenges and expertise needed which present a real challenge to the traditional risk management efforts as
outline in the PMBOK (PMI, 2013). The DOD model offers insight into what may be an effective approach, involving the
active management of security controls on a continuous process cycle, and performed by experts in the field of cybersecurity.
This would seem to indicate it may be optimally provided as a service to project managers, rather than be replicated in every
project.
A potentially fruitful area of future research is in the area of cybersecurity threat identification. Cybersecurity threats change
very rapidly. It is almost a foregone conclusion that any definitive list will be out of date almost as soon as it is written, so
ongoing monitoring will be needed (Hendershot 2014). A general framework of the types of attacks would be useful to a project
manager as a starting point. This would require a high-level checklist that could point to the need for further analysis and
expertise.
Another area of future research is in risk assessment. Once a potential cybersecurity threat has been identified, the project team
will need a way to assess the probability of the attack and the potential impact in order that these threats may be prioritized. A
high level description of this process is described in section 11 of the PMI Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMI,
2013) but specific methods to examine cybersecurity threats needs to be researched. Specifically, consideration should be
given to:
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What are the characteristics of a project that would invite attention from potential attackers?
What motivations would inspire cyber attacks
Would certain motivations potentially affect the methods chosen by potential attackers
Who are the potential attackers, and what are their motivations and capabilities?
Which ideological characteristics could influence attacker behavior, if any?
What are the risks of attribution and consequences to the attacker if caught, and how will this affect the likelihood of
an attack?

Many models for risk assessment exist, and future research could focus on identifying models that yield useful information
relatively quickly based on information likely to be available to the project manager. An example of this type of research can
be found in a study of e-voting risks. This effort used a combination of threat tree analysis and Monte Carlo simulations to
perform quantitative analysis of specific risks (Pardue, Yasinsac, and Landry, 2010). A similar method may be generalized
and used to assess cybersecurity risks in a wide range of projects.
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